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ABSTRACT
Kosovo is the largest per capita recipient of EU financial aid in the world, and is 
home to the largest civilian crisis management mission ever launched by the Union 
(EULEX). However, it is questionable whether this assistance has been sufficiently 
effective. The judiciary continues to suffer from political interference, inefficiency 
and a lack of transparency and enforcement.
This paper considers the EU’s assistance to Kosovo in the field of the Rule of Law 
and attempts to assess whether it is achieving its intended results. It discusses what 
EULEX’s impact has been on overall progress in the main areas of the Rule of Law: 
the police and justice.
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RESUMEN
Kosovo es el mayor receptor per cápita de la ayuda financiera de la UE en el mundo, y es 
el hogar de la mayor misión de gestión civil de crisis jamás lanzado por la Unión Europea 
(EULEX). Sin embargo, es dudoso que esta ayuda haya sido suficientemente eficaz. El poder 
judicial sigue sufriendo la interferencia política, la ineficiencia y la falta de transparencia y 
cumplimiento. En este trabajo se considera la asistencia de la UE para Kosovo en el ámbito 
del Estado de Derecho y se intenta evaluar si se están alcanzando los resultados previstos . 
Se discute el impacto de EULEX en el progreso global de las principales áreas del Estado de 
Derecho: la policía y la justicia.
Palabras clave: Unión Europea, EULEX, policía, justicia, Estado de Derecho.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Rule of Law is a highly contested concept –perhaps, as Jeremy Waldron suggests, 
even drawing on familiar terminology, “an essentially contested concept” (Waldron, 2002). 
Yet, as the present paper is primarily interested in evaluating the impact of the European 
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) regarding two of its pillars, police and 
justice, this conceptual instability is less an analytical hurdle than a threshold insight.
Building and strengthening the Rule of Law in third countries, particularly those in 
transition or those emerging from a period of armed conflict, has become a central focus 
of the work of the European Union (EU). It is recognized that the advancement of the 
Rule of Law is essential to the maintenance of peace and security, the realization of 
sustainable development, and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
In this setting, this article aims to analyse EULEX’s impact on the Rule of Law in Kosovo 
and answer the following questions: Has EU assistance been effective in the field of (the) 
Rule of Law? What has progress regarding the police and the judiciary been like? What 
have EULEX’s main difficulties been in this field?
The article is organized as follows: The first part begins with a conceptual approach 
to the Rule of Law and its importance in post-conflict situations such as Kosovo. In 
this part, we argue that the Rule of Law is one essential factor of the peacebuilding 
strategies of the EU in its aims to achieve peace and stability. The second part analyses 
EULEX as the largest crisis management operation ever launched by the EU and some 
of the constraints on it since its deployment in 2008. The mission continues to operate 
principally based on its initial mandate provided by the Council Joint Action 2008/124/
CFSP of February 2008, and apart from some follow-up amendments made to it, the 
mission’s raison d’être remains unchanged. In addition to its overall aim of assisting 
Kosovo in strengthening its Rule of Law institutions and ensuring their independence, 
the mission continues to hold some executive powers. It enjoys such powers especially 
when dealing with war crimes and organized crime and corruption, while at the same 
time covering the police, customs, and judicial sectors.
In the third part we attempt to assess what EULEX’s impact has been on overall progress 
in Kosovo in the Rule of Law’s main areas: police and justice. We then conclude that, 
despite the EU’s significant assistance, progress in improving the Rule of Law in Kosovo 
has been limited by worryingly high levels of organized crime and corruption that 
continue to be present within Kosovan institutions.
II. THE RULE OF LAW
Rule of Law institutions are considered indispensable for internal security and law 
enforcement purposes, and for ensuring the transparency, accountability and control 
of security forces (Hurwitz and Studdard, 2005: 2). Thus, it is possible to argue that the 
Rule of Law has become a critical component of the current debate on peacebuilding 
strategies.
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While the judiciary is the primary institution concerned with the Rule of Law, the inclusion 
of Rule of Law assistance as part of integrated conflict management approaches has 
reinforced pre-existing linkages with governance and security institutions, and further 
justifies the need to place Rule of Law reforms within a broader analytical framework.
Over the past decade, the EU has increasingly supported the implementation of missions 
designed to strengthen the Rule of Law in countries susceptible to or recovering from 
violent conflict. Policy-making and programming activities have included advice on: 
constitution-making and legislative drafting, judicial and law enforcement reforms; 
support for human rights institutions, anti-corruption and transparency initiatives, and 
regulatory mechanisms and administrative law.
There is a growing body of literature on the subject and greater awareness about the 
importance of these missions in vulnerable countries, such as Kosovo.1 While the relevance 
of the Rule of Law in volatile situations is generally undisputed, the challenges and 
constraints in the implementation of these missions in insecure environments and the 
real contributions to the prevention or mitigation of conflicts are issues that have yet 
to be fully explored.
The Rule of Law is a concept defined by the United Nations Secretary-General 
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public 
and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly 
promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are 
consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, 
measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before 
the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness 
and procedural and legal transparency (UN Security Council, 2004: parag. 6).
The definition encompasses a wide spectrum of interdependent institutions, competencies 
and actors who operate within the inter-dependent sub-sectors of justice and security and 
converge under the broader scope of the Rule of Law and governance. These sub-sectors 
include, inter alia: justice, the judiciary, law-enforcement corrections, civilian oversight 
mechanisms, civil society, and, customary law and traditional conflict-resolution.
Scholars and practitioners largely regard this definition as an important step forward in 
clarifying the nature and the boundaries of the Rule of Law (IPI 2012: 2). Given its strong 
reference to adherence to human rights norms and standards, it represents an effort to 
move towards a thorough interpretation, and not solely an effort to consolidate the least 
common denominator. However, it remains a conceptual definition with no legal value.
Peace and stability can only prevail if the population perceives that (UN Security 
Council, 2004: 4).
1 For a review of the growth of the Rule of Law in recent years, see: Carothers (2003); Belton (2005).
TERESA CIERCO, LILIANA REIS
648
politically charged issues, such as ethnic discrimination, unequal distribution of 
wealth and social services, abuse of power...can be addressed in a legitimate and 
fair manner.
Thus, the task of establishing the Rule of Law requires a comprehensive definition that 
addresses interrelated justice and security institutions and good governance with due 
attention to political, economic, social, and even psychological factors. The breakdown 
of the Rule of Law is the most significant indicator of an escalating conflict, and thus 
critical for conflict prevention.
In this paper, we analyse the EU contribution to the Rule of Law in Kosovo and two of its 
important pillars: justice and security. Justice is understood as “an ideal of accountability 
and fairness in the protection of rights and the prevention and punishment of wrongs” 
(Idem). It implies regard for the rights of the accused, for the interests of victims and 
for the well-being of society at large. It involves: judiciaries, informal and traditional 
justice systems, alternative dispute resolution structures, legislatures, oversight bodies, 
the police, prisons and prosecution services, relevant line ministries, lawyers, and civil 
society organizations (Ball et al., 2007).
Security is “an elastic and diverse concept that can be understood in different forms, 
depending on its objects: the perception of threats, the protected values, and the means 
through which these values can be protected” (Nasu, 2011: 1). From a security perspective, 
Rule of Law institutions are regarded as indispensable for internal security and law 
enforcement purposes, and for ensuring the transparency, accountability and control 
of security forces such as the police and the military. According to the Department for 
International Development (DFID, 2003: 30).
responsible and accountable security forces reduce the risk of conflict, provide 
security for citizens and create the right environment for sustainable development. 
The overall objective of security sector reform is to contribute to a secure environment 
that is conducive to development.
This is one of the reasons for EU assistance to the Western Balkans, and especially to 
Kosovo, in the field of the Rule of Law. In Fukayama words weak or failing states, may 
be “the single most important problem for international order. They abuse human rights, 
provoke humanitarian disasters, drive waves of immigration, threaten neighbours and 
shelter terrorists” and, among others, he gives the example of Kosovo (Fukayama, 2004: 92).
Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, but this step 
was not followed by universal recognition of Kosovo. Five EU Member States have 
not recognized Kosovo’s independence, which has led the EU to adopt what is termed 
a ‘status neutral’ position.2 All Member States have nevertheless agreed that the EU 
should provide substantial funding to Kosovo with a view to ensuring the stability not 
only of Kosovo, but also of the wider Western Balkans region and Europe as a whole.
2 The five EU member states that do not recognize Kosovo are: Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia,
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The bulk of the assistance was provided under the CARDS programme over the period 
2000-2006 (Council Resolution 2666/2000), replacing the previous OBNOVA programme. 
After this, CARDS was replaced by the Instrument Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 
programme (Council Regulation 1085/2006) covering the period 2007-2013. The situation 
on the ground was by then quite different. During the CARDS period, many of the 
states had to (re-)build public institutions after the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, 
requiring restructuring of agencies that had been set up under very different political and 
constitutional regimes, preparing new framework laws, etc. At the same time issues such 
as the fight against organised crime and corruption assumed increased importance. The 
speed and depth of subsequent transformations have varied from country to country. 
The IPA programmes in the Western Balkan states have thus increasingly become defined 
by the specific challenges and constraints in each state, though with the overarching EU 
accession criteria remaining largely the same.
Looking at the particular sub-fields within the larger Rule of Law universe, specific 
judicial reform, the fight against corruption and organised crime, we can say that these 
are seen as particularly important challenges across the Western Balkans and particularly 
in Kosovo, challenges which need to be successfully addressed in order for these states 
to become members of the EU.
Over the last decade the international community has invested major resources in 
peacekeeping, reconstruction, institution building, economic development and Rule of 
Law assistance to Kosovo. During the period 1999-2007 Kosovo received 3.5 billion Euros 
in donor assistance, two thirds of which came from the European Commission and EU 
Member States.3 A 2008 Donor Conference pledged an additional 1.2 billion Euros for 
the period 2009-11, including 508 million euro from the Commission. Overall, Kosovo is 
“the biggest recipient per capita of EU assistance in the whole world”.4 During the five 
years 2007-2011, Kosovo received IPA funding totalling € 422 million. Of this, funding 
for judicial reform and the fight against corruption and organised crime amounted to 
€ 49.2 million –about 11.7% of total IPA funding (Berenschot and Imagos, 2013: 9). This 
represents the second-highest share of IPA funding in the region, the largest in terms 
of absolute funding.5
We can thus affirm that the EU is seriously committed to help Kosovo to be a secure 
and stable country in this region.
III. EULEX
The EU began preparations for a mission in Kosovo in 2006. It was clear from the 
beginning of the status negotiations that a fundamental reorganisation of the international 
community’s operations in Kosovo, and consequently those of the EU, must follow 
3 Interview conducted with an high official of European Commission in Brussels, November 2012.
4 Statement by President Barroso following his meeting with Hashim Thaci, Prime Minister of Kosovo, Pristina, 
20 May 2011.
5 Interview conducted with an high official of European Commission in Brussels, November 2012.
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the formal solution of the status issue. According to the international plans, after the 
declaration of independence the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) was to be succeeded by an international mission undertaken by the 
EU, as detailed in the Ahtisaari plan. The European Union Planning Team Kosovo, 
established in April 2006, assumed the task of making preparations for the EULEX 
mission (Official Journal of the EU, 2006).
The report published in July 2006 by Javier Solana and Enlargement Commissioner 
Olli Rehn, entitled On the Future EU Role and Contribution in Kosovo, and formulated EU 
involvement in terms of three components. The first of these was the installation of an EU 
Special Representative (EUSR) on the model of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who would at the 
same time head the International Civilian Office (ICO), which was tasked with assisting 
Kosovo in the EU integration process and implementing the provisions of the Ahtisaari 
Plan (ICO, 2009). The second was the definition of the role of EULEX in the area of the 
Rule of Law. In parallel with this, funds were to be made available for Kosovo from the 
future Pre-Accession Instruments. Thirdly, the EU planned at this time to intensify its 
activities in Kosovo within the framework of the Stabilisation and Association Process 
(SAP), as well as to prepare concrete steps for the accession of Kosovo to the EU (Dzihic 
and Kramer, 2009: 15).
EULEX was conceived as the EU’s biggest ever civilian foreign mission, and was intended 
to support Kosovan institutions in the area of the Rule of Law, and in particular in terms 
of strengthening capacities in the police, the judiciary and the customs service. The legal 
basis for the mission was created in a Joint Action resolution of the European Council 
on 4 February 2008 (Portilla Gómez, 2012: 21).
Meanwhile, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia, confirming its 
acceptance of the Comprehensive Settlement Proposal for Kosovo Status (CSP), its 
agreement to the deployment of EULEX and the continuation of the NATO presence. 
In April 2008, the government adopted the “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo”, 
which came into force in June 2008, when Kosovo assumed a number of responsibilities 
from UNMIK.
In this context, in December 2008, Javier Solana, High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union (CFSP), announced the deployment 
of EULEX, saying that (Council of the EU 2008):
The EULEX mission is deployed in order to assist Kosovo in its progress towards 
reaching European standards in the areas of police, justice, customs and correctional 
services. [...] The mission is proof of the EU’s strong commitment towards the Western 
Balkans and it will contribute to the enhancement of stability in the whole region.
A core function of EULEX is to monitor, mentor, and advise (MMA) Kosovo’s Rule of 
Law institutions in establishing institutional practices that support the country’s overall 
democratization.
The EU’s EULEX mission –officially launched on 9 December 2008– is its biggest and 
financially most lavish civil intervention abroad to date. EULEX has a total of around 
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2,250 international and local staff and an annual budget of around 111 million Euros 
(EULEX Kosovo, 2012).
EULEX is financed from the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) budget, 
with funding being implemented through a contract between the European Commission 
and the EULEX Head of Mission, who is personally responsible for the EULEX budget.6
In a strategic review of EULEX, the European External Action Service (EEAS) proposed 
the maintenance of some executive functions and the extension of its mandate until June 
2014. The Commission service primarily responsible for dealing with Kosovo is the 
Directorate General for Enlargement. It is responsible for the management of IPA, which 
is the main source of funding for assistance projects in Kosovo. EULEX is managed by 
the Civilian Operations commander, who is the Director of the Civilian Planning and 
Conduct Capability, which is based in Brussels and forms part of the EEAS. He is under 
the political control and strategic direction of the Political and Security Committee of 
the Council. The European Union Office manages the implementation of the IPA.
In the period 2007-11 more than half of EU assistance was allocated to the Rule of Law 
in Kosovo, principally through the CSDP mission but also through the IPA (see Table 
1). In this period, IPA funded projects in the areas of policing, justice and customs, as 
well as funding specific anti-corruption projects up to a total of 92,47 million euros 
(ECA 2012: 12).
Table 1. EU Assistance for the Rule of Law 2007-11 (commitments in million euro) (1)
Instrument 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
EULEX (including Planning Team) 
(current budget line: 19.03.01.02) 76,50 120,00 121,22 120,75 144,00 582,47
IPA wider Rule of Law (2) 
(22.02.02 and 22.02.04.01) 9,30 44,52 12,05 14,20 12,40 92,47
Instrument for Stability 
(19.06.01.01) 0,00 5,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 5,00
Total EU assistance to the wider 
Rule of Law 85,80 169,52 133,27 134,95 156,40 679,94
Total EU assistance to Kosovo 231,70 331,10 238,22 198,95 212,70 1 212,67
Total Rule of Law as % of total EU 
assistance 37% 51% 56% 68% 74% 56%
1. The EU general budget only provides details of the EULEX figures since 2011. In this table the 
Court has used the figures provided in the 2011 EU budget for the years 2009, 2010 and 2011, and 
figures obtained from the Commission’s internal accounting system for previous years.
2. In addition to policial and judicial projects, IPA “wider Rule of Law” projects include projects 
related to anticorruption, customs and public financial management reform.
Source: ECA 2012: 13.
6 Idem.
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All this financial assistance corroborates the EU commitment to play a leading role 
in ensuring the stability of Kosovo and also its willingness to assist the economic and 
political development in line with the European perspective on the region.
However, according to the European Court of Auditors (ECA), “despite significant EU 
assistance, progress in improving the Rule of Law is limited” (2012: 15). This is an object 
of great concern for the EU. As Greicevci (2011) argues, the stakes are high
a EULEX failure in Kosovo would be a failure of the European project in Kosovo, 
and potentially in the entire region of the western Balkans.
EULEX has faced a rough road in executing its mandate ever since it deployed, and 
did not escape severe criticism. Its overall budget and the large number of staff, at least 
compared to other EU missions abroad, have, by default, increased expectations both 
among the local population and among the policy makers in Brussels and the EU Member 
States. The initial statements about the mission’s intentions and capacities as regards 
fighting corruption and organized crime in Kosovo have not only increased expectations 
but have also provided hopes that great improvements would take place on the ground. 
The hopes and trust that the people in Kosovo have lost in their own institutions for 
fighting some of its biggest societal problems, organized crime and corruption and 
political interferences in independent institutions, have shifted over to EULEX.
Regardless of whether or not these expectations were realistic, they have not been met, 
and hopes soon began to fade. Organized crime and corruption continue to be present at 
worrying levels within the institutions of Kosovo, and political pressure on the judicial 
and other independent institutions persists, regardless of some improvements. One of 
the basic problems is that there are almost completely contrasting perceptions regarding 
EULEX’s work amongst Kosovo’s local population and institutions,7 those in Brussels 
not directly involved with the mission but who bear the cost on the one hand,8 and those 
who are directly engaged with the mission in Kosovo and Brussels on the other hand. 
Public satisfaction with the work of the mission in Kosovo stands at 22 percent, while 
in Brussels the perception is that 70 percent of Kosovar public opinion wants EULEX’s 
presence.9 But what has been achieved, up to now, in the main areas of the Rule of Law, 
police and justice? Is EULEX doing a “good job? What have been its main constraints?
IV. EULEX CONSTRAINTS
 At ground level, since the period of supervised independence expired, on 10 September 
2012, EULEX has faced numerous distinctive challenges, many of which continue to 
hinder its work particularly in the north of Kosovo. According to the European Court of 
7 Among the local institutions critical voices have been heard from and among: The President of Kosovo, 
Kosovo’s Interior Minister, Kosovo’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice.
8 Among those are Members of the European Parliament (MEP), some of the Member States, NATO, European 
Court of Auditors, etc.
9 Interview conducted with high official of European Commission in Brussels.
EULEX’S IMPACT ON THE RULE OF LAW IN KOSOVO
653
Auditors (2012: 29): “EU interventions [in the north] have been very limited and there 
has been almost no progress in establishing the Rule of Law”.
In the north of Kosovo, EULEX should have been primarily concentrating on reducing 
crime and smuggling and tackling a number of organized and violent crime cases. However, 
there are a number of obstacles that have prevented EULEX from making meaningful 
advancements in these areas in the north of the territory. To start with, EULEX and the 
Kosovo Police (KP) have faced difficulties in travelling freely throughout the north. 
This has prevented them from realizing their objective of instating the Rule of Law. We 
must not forget that the North of Kosovo is one of the most ethnically heterogeneous 
areas, and the creation of political conditions for multi-ethnicity and reconciliation of 
all presented itself as the main challenge to the previous UNMIK (Simonsen, 2004: 294, 
305). Networks of Kosovo Serbs in the north erected barricades that effectively prevented 
EULEX and Kosovo Customs and Police from reaching the northern border and prevented 
people and goods from moving freely throughout much of northern Kosovo. This has 
undoubtedly placed additional pressure on NATO’s KFOR.10 NATO Secretary General 
Anders Rasmussen has claimed that EULEX’s insufficient capacity has plagued NATO’s 
peacekeeping mission with additional tasks, which were not anticipated or mandated, 
particularly in the north.11 In particular, EULEX’s inability to halt illegal traffic across 
the northern borders has forced KFOR to assume additional responsibilities.
KFOR, acting under a security mandate, inhibited trafficking and isolated traffickers 
along certain routes, but EULEX, acting under a Rule of Law mandate, failed to act in 
close communication with KFOR to identify and arrest those smugglers and traffickers 
who frequently use alternative routes across the border (GLPS, 2013: 20).
Moreover, the perception that EULEX is implementing the Ahtisaari Plan and not 
maintaining a status-neutral platform has plagued EULEX in its border control and 
customs efforts. In this regard, Serbs in the north and Serbia itself have viewed functional 
customs as a sign of EULEX’s implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan and acceptance of 
Kosovo’s statehood.
Within the context of the June 2012 mandate, EULEX has taken some basic steps to increase 
its presence in the north with more active involvement in the area of the judiciary and 
with [the] stronger presence of a new special police unit in northern Kosovo. However, 
matters are still difficult and EULEX’s action continues to be strongly limited in the 
north, which is considered the most criminalized part of Kosovo.12
10 Under the authority of the United Nations (UN Security Council Resolution 1244) NATO has been leading 
a peace support operation in Kosovo since 12 June 1999 in support of wider international efforts to build 
peace and stability in the area. KFOR’s mission is to: contribute to a secure environment and ensure public 
safety and order; support and coordinate the international humanitarian effort and civil presence; support 
the development of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo; and to support the development 
of the Kosovo Security Force. Available at: http://www.aco.nato.int/kfor/about-us/mission.aspx (accessed 
on July 3, 2013).
11 B92 (2012). NATO chief criticizes EU mission in Kosovo. Available at: http://www.b92.net/eng/news/
politicsarticle.php?yyyy=2012&mm=04&dd=24&nav_id=79921 (accessed on July 4, 2013). 
12 This situation is mainly due to the lack of control over the north by the Pristina-based Kosovo authorities. It 
has the reputation for being a ‘safe haven’ for organised crime due to the lack of both a strong police force 
and a functioning judicial system (Council of the EU, 2011: 29).
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Another constraint on EULEX’s work results from its lack of human resources. Much of 
its staff is seconded, contracted by their respective member states. While this is normal, 
as member states are individually participants in each European Security and Defence 
Policy mission, many policies related to the seconded staff from individual member states 
have exposed EULEX to a number of problems, including high staff turnover, poor local 
knowledge among staff, and member state influence over EULEX’s operational practices 
and standards. While staff contracted by Brussels usually stay in Kosovo for a number 
of years, staff contracted by member states “are often seconded for too short periods, 
usually for one year with limited opportunity for contract renewal” (ECA, 2012: 44). The 
high turnover rate among EULEX staff causes a number of complications, preventing the 
formation of trust and strong ties between EULEX staff and the staff of local institutions. 
Additionally, high turnover rates cause legal and operational inconsistencies as well 
as insufficient familiarity with local practices among EULEX staff. These short-term 
jobs are also more attractive to younger and less experienced professionals, which 
compound the lack of expertise and “the necessary capacity building skills” (Idem). In 
essence, EULEX lacks sufficient human and professional capacity to exercise its mandate. 
It should have worked with member states to ensure that the mission operated with 
the authorized number of staff and that staff were deployed for an appropriate time 
period and had the skills to be successful. Compounding the staffing failures due to 
staff inexperience and high turnover rates was the absence of an effective coordinated 
control mechanism, result evaluation, or external auditing that was used to translate 
output into accountable performance. According to the European Court of Auditors 
(2012: 39), “without an adequate system to monitor and analyze the amount of time staff 
spend on individual MMA actions and on executive functions, and without information 
on payments made to seconded staff”, EULEX was unable to evaluate the performance 
of staff in each respective action and was unable to “assess how a cost-effective EULEX 
compares with other forms of EU capacity building assistance”.
 Moreover, EULEX has found it difficult to collaborate effectively with and transfer 
expertise and capacity to local institutions. The European Court of Auditors identified 
coordination between the EU institutions and with other donors and Kosovo authorities 
as an area where serious improvements should be made (Idem: 33). As it stands, EULEX 
has shifted away from its duty of supporting the building of domestic capacities in Kosovo 
to fight crime and corruption. It has chosen to do its own work almost independently 
and without engendering a sense of local ownership. It maintains a number of executive 
powers over policing and in prosecuting war crimes and a number of high-profile cases of 
organized crime and corruption in order to ensure that the Rule of Law is strengthened. 
Nevertheless, strengthening the wider Rule of Law should be the sole responsibility of 
the local institutions, which will be held accountable for the progress in this area by the 
local population, as well as by EU support and conditionality for these changes to take 
place. In this regard, EULEX has done little to ensure that the Kosovan authorities are 
themselves prepared in the areas of police and justice.
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The Kosovo Police
One of EULEX’s pillars in Kosovo regarding police reform consists in the training and 
capacity reinforcement of the Kosovo Police Force (KP) in order for them to fulfil their 
mission of the construction of Rule of Law, which is essential for the promotion of 
stability and security in the territory. The EULEX mission assists the KP in its progress 
towards sustainability and accountability and in further developing and strengthening 
an independent multi-ethnic police service, ensuring that “the institution is free from 
political interference and adhering to internationally recognised standards and European 
best practices” (EULEX Report, 2012: 10).
The police component of the EULEX mission is the first pillar in providing a sustainable 
environment for the country and in achieving minimum standards of Rule of Law 
delineated by the EU. It is thus not surprising that this sector comprises the allocation of 
the highest number of human resources. The EULEX Police Component has a total strength 
of approximately 1,400 International police officers, deployed all over Kosovo (Idem). 
The personnel are structured according to their respective tasks in three departments, 
namely: crime, borders, and administration. For the EU, this division is the best way to 
address the current set of problems.
According to the EULEX Report (2012: 11), the KP is increasing the knowledge and 
skills of its specialists and introducing new systems of categorizing and recording 
crime statistics. On the point of intelligence-led policing, much has been done with 
significant results for the Kosovo Criminal Justice System, as indicated by the number 
of drug seizures and intelligence-led crime investigations (Idem). KP has developed a 
“Proactive Drug Strategy” that has shown significant results in terms of drug seizures.
Regarding the second aspect, borders, KP has faced significant challenges, and the 
overall performance in providing secure borders has been considered ‘weak’ up to now. 
The poor communication skills and the inability to fully implement the laws relating 
to migrants passing through Kosovo are just two of the problems that are mentioned in 
EULEX’s last report (2012: 13).13
Concerning the goal of “Tackling Patrols Effectively and Ensuring Public Order”, it is 
possible to observe significant improvements concerning the development of a system of 
tracking by the Special Intervention Unit and Improvised/Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
Unit, both highly specialized teams.
Finally, concerning the third aspect, administration, the KP has encountered problems in 
retaining and training civilian specialists, as well as in recruiting suitable experts from 
EULEX and other sources to support its efforts. The process of organizational change 
has proved to be difficult. The most problematic areas are considered the promotion 
13 The EULEX Report affirms, “virtually no progress was made in terms of verifying KP Border compliance 
with the laws related to Migration” (2012: 14).
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system and the capital expenditure performance, due to the interference of those in 
senior positions and traditional negative practices such as corruption.
Kosovo Justice
EULEX was less successful in its MMA actions relating to the justice sector (which have 
now ceased with its new mandate). EULEX “utterly failed to improve the local judiciary 
or stem corruption and impunity” (Capussela, 2012).
The justice component of EULEX was active in all Kosovo courts with the aim of 
improving and strengthening Kosovo’s judiciary to make it “fully multiethnic, impartial, 
free from political influence and capable of holding fair trials according to international 
standards” (EULEX site).
After its programmatic restructuring in mid-2012, in which the police, justice, and customs 
components were rearranged into executive departments, the mission decreased the 
number of its international staff by about 25%. Most of the reductions occurred amongst 
police officers. Nonetheless, there was no corresponding increase of personnel in the justice 
sector. To date, the justice component has comprised only 36 judges and 24 prosecutors 
working with the mission (KIPRED, 2013: 13). This means that there is an average of 
1 judge sitting in each of the regular courts, which deal with criminal proceedings.14
In addition to the mission’s competences, EULEX judges and prosecutors retained 
certain executive responsibilities by working together with their local counterparts, 
ensuring that cases of war crimes, terrorism, organized crime, corruption, inter-ethnic 
crimes, financial/economic crimes and other serious crimes were properly investigated, 
prosecuted, adjudicated and enforced, according to the applicable law (EULEX, 2008).15
EULEX did not establish internal mechanisms to ensure the transparency of judicial and 
prosecutorial allocation of cases, performance and decisions or to ensure oversight and 
internal control mechanisms over the work of the prosecution and judiciary. There was 
“insufficient transparency in the allocation of cases among judges and prosecutors” (EAC, 
2012: 22), as EULEX failed to institute pre-determined objective criteria and procedural 
safeguards for the allocation of cases to judges and prosecutors. This has allowed for 
political interference and revealed EULEX’s failure to establish sustainable mechanisms 
to ensure the political independence of domestic judges and prosecutors. Political 
interference remains a major problem to the point that “judges are not fully willing 
to render their judgments on the basis of the law only, but tend to act in anticipatory 
obedience to external influences” (OSCE, 2012: 7). The threat to the independence of 
the court system comes from several sides. From the state it is primarily through the 
control of the budget for the court system, and/or the appointment or termination of 
14 In Kosovo there are 24 municipal courts and 2 additional branches, 5 district courts, 1 economic court, the 
Supreme Court, and the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court.
15 They also worked on a number of cases received from UNMIK and on new cases, including on mixed panels 
with Kosovo judges and prosecutors. 
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judges and prosecutors and finally the exertion of political pressure in specific court 
rulings. From the private sector it is through the buying or influencing of legislation 
and/or outcomes in court cases, though this issue seems to be of much less concern in 
the region than the threat of state interference and influence.
While EULEX’s presence can be credited with removing some level of political interference 
in the courts (GPLS, 2013: 20), it has not enabled Kosovo courts to develop a sustainable 
capacity to act free from political interference. Additionally, political interference in the 
form of threats and intimidation as well as insufficient expertise have rendered the local 
judiciary unable to handle serious cases of organized crime, corruption, and war crimes 
(Idem). While these cases exist under the purview of EULEX’s executive functions, 
the insufficient expertise of local authorities to handle these cases reveals that EULEX 
did not exercise its advisory function in building upon the professional education and 
professional capacities of domestic judges and prosecutors (Idem: 20).
EULEX also failed in establishing a functional judicial system in the north via the local 
court in Mitrovica, due to the fact that Serbian judges made decisions based on Serbian 
laws while Albanian judges based decisions on Kosovar law (ECA, 2012: 28). Without 
functioning institutional foundations in the north, EULEX was unable to pass on any 
expertise or generate any higher capacity amongst authorities in the north of Kosovo.
As a consequence of the uncertain status of Kosovo under international law, the justice 
component is faced with the dilemma of determining the applicable legislation. There 
continue to exist three parallel sources of legislation in Kosovo. In certain cases, former 
Yugoslav laws and provisions can still be found, which continue to be applicable. At the 
same time, there are extensive UNMIK regulations still in place, and following Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence, legislation has been adopted by the Kosovo Assembly.
The relationship between these legal acts and their compatibility remains problematic. 
Considering the “status neutral” approach, most of the judges would apply UNMIK’s 
regulations still in place in Kosovo, although some of these regulations are being repealed 
by the new laws that have been adopted by the Kosovo Assembly. In this regard EULEX 
has not made any statement as to which law will be applicable, although the current 
practice reveals that most of the laws being referred to and applied in its judgements 
are those adopted after the Constitution was enacted.
Another challenging issue concerns serious crimes. The unjustified delay of up to five 
years before trials, the fact that enacting clauses of verdicts lack a legal basis, and the 
confiscations of objects derived from the commission of a criminal offence as foreseen 
in the Criminal Code of Kosovo are just some of the problems. Moreover, the reasoning 
of the verdict in many cases does not contain a clear or detailed evaluation of the 
defendant’s criminal act or of all the collected evidence, which are prerequisites for a 
judicial system within a Rule of Law.
Additionally, EULEX assessed the infrastructure available for judges in District Courts as 
insufficient. It also raised concerns with respect to access to justice and with reference to 
trials conducted in offices, which renders the participation of the public almost impossible.
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Although the number of judges and prosecutors in Kosovo remains very low, improvements 
in the judicial component have been made. This was the case with the appointment 
of new judges to the Special Chamber of the Supreme Court, Commercial Courts and 
Municipal Courts, and the decrease in the number of cases pending in Kosovan courts.
Nevertheless, there are still many constraints within Kosovo’s justice system. Firstly, 
the number and quality of cases concerned with “high profile” organized crime and 
corruption remains at ‘disappointing’ levels.16 Secondly, the number of cases completed 
in 2011 was higher than the number of cases admitted, which continues to thwart the 
most optimistic expectations. Moreover, the impunity for war crimes highlighted the 
reports of the last few years by Amnesty International, remains one of the most serious 
human rights concerns. This discontent felt and expressed by Amnesty is not recent. 
After the disappointment regarding UNMIK’s work on this issue, this non-governmental 
organization still urges the need for EULEX to prioritize the investigation and prosecution 
of war crimes in Kosovo.
Furthermore, the deficiencies of prosecutorial systems remain a serious obstacle to the 
Rule of Law in Kosovo. There have even been several cases in which defendants have 
failed to appear before the court, which has resulted in delays.
The effective implementation of the legal framework in the fight against various forms 
of organized crime remains a major challenge, particularly in the areas of prevention 
and the fight against human trafficking, drugs trafficking, and arms trafficking. Despite 
having already established important elements in the legislative framework, the Kosovan 
authorities need to achieve tangible results in this area. According to the 2010 Strategic 
Threat Assessment ‘Organised Crime in Kosovo’ conducted by the EU Office for Criminal 
Intelligence (ECA, 2012: 18).
the situation regarding organised crime in Kosovo has not changed considerably since 
the arrival of the international community in the summer of 1999…investigation of 
serious crimes is still ineffective due to limited experience and political interference.
 Organized crime being a major concern for the European Commission, in May 2012 an 
initiative at political level called ‘Structured Rule of Law Dialogue’ was launched. This 
initiative aims to (EC 2012).
provide a high level forum to regularly assess Kosovo’s progress on three issues 
in particular: the judiciary, the fight against organized crime and corruption…the 
aim…is to help Kosovo tackle any challenges in these areas at an early stage in the 
enlargement process.
16 About 380 verdicts have already been handed down, of which there are approximately 306 verdicts on criminal 
justice, including 51 verdicts in high-level organized crime and corruption cases. This means that since its 
deployment in 2008, EULEX judges have on average handed down 78 verdicts per year (or around 2.1 yearly 
verdicts per judge), of which only around 10 verdicts related to high profile organized crime and corruption 
cases (or around 0.29 such verdicts yearly per judge) (KIPRED, 2013: 12).
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V. ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION
The desire for independence and subsequent international recognition has dominated the 
overall agenda of the Kosovan authorities. But Kosovo faces other major challenges, in 
particular poverty and crime. Its GDP per capita of just 2.383 euro is the lowest in Europe.
The situation in Kosovo is still critical and highly unstable with regard to every important 
aspect of society, despite the enormous injection of resources by the international 
community since 1999. This applies in particular to the economic and social situation, 
the Rule of Law, with regard to which the judicial system is powerless in the face of 
deeply entrenched corruption and mafia influence in society and its structures, and 
the relations between the Albanian majority and the Serbs, as well as other minorities 
living in Kosovo.
It has been possible to establish reasonably well-functioning political institutions and 
to hold parliamentary and municipal elections without major problems. However, the 
development of a democratic political culture has been extremely difficult. The strategies 
of UNMIK,17 the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the EU for 
supporting democracy-building in Kosovo have been only moderately successful, among 
other things owing to the role of the international community as representatives of a 
protectorate structure. Their broadly applied right to intervene has decisively narrowed 
the scope and autonomy of Kosovar political actors.
One of the main reasons why Kosovar policy-makers have, over the years, failed to 
pursue an effective reform policy in such crucial areas as economic and social policy, 
education, health care and administration has been a status fixation on the part of the 
Kosovar political class. The achievement of independence, even if for the time being 
this means only a “limited sovereignty”, has become a kind of vague screen of a better 
future on which the population has projected unrealistic expectations, namely the rapid 
improvement in the economic situation and the solution of the most pressing social 
problems. As a result of these expectations the Kosovan authorities find themselves 
trapped. Rapid progress, especially in the economic and social realm, is not possible, 
since the urgent problems in Kosovo are to a considerable extent structural in nature, that 
is, largely the outcome of extremely unfavourable historical and societal circumstances 
and framework conditions.
The collapse of the Rule of Law in the 1990s created a vacuum, which has been 
exploited by organized crime both from inside and outside Kosovo. At the same time, 
the clientelism prevalent throughout Kosovo society and the traditional recourse to a 
clan-based customary law hinder the establishment and fostering of the Rule of Law.
17 In June 1999, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1244/99, which set up a United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in place of the Government of Serbia. It mandated 
UNMIK to carry out all aspects of civil administration, establish democratic institutions and create the basis 
for eventually resolving Kosovo’s status. The immediate task of UNMIK in conjunction with the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) was to establish law and order by ending the violence and repression and allowing for 
a safe return of all refugees. 
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Strengthening the Rule of Law in Kosovo is generally considered a pre-requisite for 
economic development. Moreover, given the international nature of organized crime, the 
strengthening of the Rule of Law in Kosovo is also important for the EU’s internal security.
According to estimates by the Directorate of Organized Crime, the daily turnover of 
[business resulting from?] organized crime in Kosovo amounts to around € 1.5 million, 
corresponding to an annual turnover of € 550 million. This represents around one 
quarter of Kosovo’s Gross Social Product (Dzihic and Kramer, 2009: 13). Apparently, 
organised crime is the sole profitable branch of the economy –in which there is 
cooperation between Albanians and Serbs. Criminal organisations in the Balkans– in 
particular Albanians, Kosovans, Serbs and Macedonians, together with Turkish gangs 
–control the heroin trade in Europe. The Balkans is the transit route for heroin from 
Afghanistan, and increasingly from other Central Asian countries. Around 90 per cent of 
the heroin destined for central, western and northern Europe passes through the region 
(Idem). According to the European police authorities, Kosovo Albanian gangs play an 
important role in the organisation and control of drug smuggling routes in the Balkans, 
as well as the regional and international distribution networks in the surrounding area, 
for example, in Switzerland, Italy and Greece (UN Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008: 
58). Moreover, Kosovo still remains a source, transit point and destination for human 
trafficking (EC, 2008: 20).
The entanglement of structures of organised crime with the political class is a major 
hindrance to positive future development in Kosovo. In this regard Dusan Reljic´ speaks 
of a “nexus between politics and cross-border crime” and the phenomenon of so-
called “multifunction persons” who pursue political, economic and criminal interests 
simultaneously (Reljic´, 2007: 16).
Kosovo has only one project specifically dedicated to anti-corruption work. With a 
budget of € 1 million, the project was to support the Kosovo Anti-Corruption Agency, 
the police, the prosecution service and the Ministry of Justice to develop anti-corruption 
policies and a legal framework, while also promoting public awareness.
The Law against Corruption was adopted in 2004 and the Kosovo Anti-corruption Agency 
was established in July 2006. Anticorruption Strategy 2004-2007 and a subsequent one 
adopted in 2009 with an Action Plan Against Corruption for 2009-2011 were put in 
place, and steps have been taken to strengthen institutional and legislative capacities to 
prevent and confront corruption. Awareness in civil society regarding the seriousness 
of corruption has improved, though high-level corruption is considered prevalent in 
many areas and remains a serious concern (EC, 2012: 10).
EULEX has had low levels of success in prosecuting major cases of organized crime and 
corruption in Kosovo. 202 verdicts had been issued for serious criminal cases by mid-
October 2011, with 14 related to organized crime and 30 related to major corruption 
(GLPS, 2013: 11). By April 2012, EULEX judges had handed down verdicts in more 
than two hundred serious criminal cases, 46 in major organized crime and corruption 
cases (Nick, 2012). However “when you measure these verdicts against the number of 
judges…it appears that a EULEX judge has on average resolved 0.17 cases a year of 
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corruption and 0.07 cases of organized crime –this is way below what is expected of 
them” (Balkan Insight, 2011).
EULEX has failed in tackling serious crime and corruption for a number of reasons. 
There is difficulty in calling (and protecting) witnesses that could testify in high-profile 
cases of crime and corruption (ECA 2012: 19). Therefore, as a consequence, witnesses are 
unwilling to provide evidence out of fear. Furthermore, political interference and poor 
management have inhibited EULEX from being successful in tackling organized crime 
and corruption. In some cases, even Pristina’s political elite is preventing EULEX from 
tackling high-level cases of crime and corruption in Kosovo, due to the fact that some 
of these cases include a mix of people belonging or linked to major political parties and 
businesses (KIPRED 2013: 18).
VI. CONCLUSION
Although EULEX is by far the largest CSDP mission ever, its effectiveness in strengthening 
the Rule of Law has been reduced by different constraints. If we consider the endogenous 
features, we can find: political interference, inefficiency, a lack of transparency and legal 
personality recognized both at internal and international levels. When we consider the 
exogenous features, we can mention the lack of political will on the part of EU member 
states to provide sufficient seconded staff to EULEX.
EULEX has also been handicapped by not having a legal personality and by maintaining 
a poor connection with the incentives and conditionality used by the Commission, and 
EEAS have so far proved of limited use in promoting progress on Rule of Law issues in 
Kosovo, also demonstrating the lack of coherence between the different EU institutions.
What can be questioned are the allocation and distribution of resources among the 
various EULEX missions. There are an overwhelming number of resources devoted to 
the task, including the police component, which nevertheless lacks a serious strategy 
as regards staffing, especially in terms of the judicial component, which has resulted 
in a reduced number of cases resolved. However, this poor resource management can 
also be seen amongst the Kosovo authorities, which continue to suffer from a weak 
budget allocation. The results of the assessment show that there is an urgent need to re-
allocate resources, especially in relation to the local judicial personnel, with the need to 
increase the number of judges and prosecutors and enhance police investigative work. 
Therefore, whereas the EULEX budget seems high enough to meet initial expectations, 
the problem is that the Kosovo budget is insufficient to fulfil the required needs.
If it is true that substantial improvements can be observed in Kosovo in recent years, 
in particular since the EULEX mission reached the area, the strengthening of the 
Kosovo Police and the Justice System is still characterized by several difficulties that 
have been described in this paper, including corruption, organized crime and the 
insufficient priority accorded by the Kosovan authorities to the Rule of Law agenda. 
Only these can explain why the huge amount of EU assistance has achieved such 
limited results until now.
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Police and justice reform is a task of continual improvement and incremental positive 
change. It is a process essential to state building, and to securing peace and development. 
Without a functioning and accountable judiciary in Kosovo there can be no lasting peace 
or sustainable development.
The local context in which EULEX operates provides little hope for such an international 
mission to realize the mandate vested in it. Fighting organized crime and corruption 
on so many levels in a vibrant yet connected society provides little hope for such 
threats to be dealt with from abroad. The mandate that EULEX has should be gradually 
transferred to inhabitants to implement. Therefore it is important to establish nationally 
owned Rule of Law institutions, breaking their strong dependence on EULEX and the 
international community.
At the same time, it is important that justice institutions do not operate in a vacuum. They 
must be nationally owned, accountable and trusted by the citizens for whom they were 
established. Only then can outside assistance such as that of EULEX be truly helpful.
The state institutions must have the primary responsibility in ensuring the proper 
implementation of all aspects of Rule of Law should Kosovo ever want to be fully capable 
of functioning on its own and able to accede to EU membership.
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